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RECENT DECISIONS
possible to apply conventional rules of indemnity, contribution, assump-
tion of risk, or contributory negligence, without extensive redefinition,
to cases founded on strict liability. The underlying theories of the two
are incompatible.
TiaOMAS E. OBENBERGER
Taxation: Determination of Gross Income for Percentage De-
pletion Purposes-In Dravo Corporation v. United States,' the United
States Court of Claims added another link to the chain of cases ques-
tioning Section 613 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The Court,
inter alia, held that Dravo Corporation (hereafter referred to as Dravo)
for the tax year 1955 must compute its gross income for depletion pur-
poses2 by using per ton prices at the dredges rather than the per ton
prices at the shore installations. The latter prices included various trans-
portation and stockpiling costs.
The depletion issue concerns deposits dredges from an island in the
Ohio River, transported to shore installations, and sold during 1955.
The deposits were extracted by two dredges which performed the
washing and sizing operations. Since stockpiling on the dredges was a
practical impossibility, the sand and gravel was then moved to barges
adjacent to the dredges. The first general category of Dravo's cus-
tomers included those who utilized their own barges to pick up the sand
and gravel at Dravo's dredges or made special arrangements with Dravo
to deliver direct from the barges to the customer's location. The proceeds
from the sand and gravel sales to customers in this first classification
were not involved in the contest since these proceeds were derived from
sale of products which never reached Dravo's shore installations. The
controversy applied to the sand and gravel, about fifty per cent of
Dravo's tonnage for 1955, which was sold to the second category of
customers-those who purchased at the shore installations. Dravo owned
1348 F. 2d 542 (1965).
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, ch. 736, §613(c), 68A Stat. 209:
(c) DEFINITION OF GROSS INCOME FROM PROPERTY-For purposes of this
section-
(1) GROSS INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY-The term "gross income from the
property" means, in the case of a property other than an oil or gas
well, the gross income from mining.
(2) MINING-The term "mining" includes not merely the extraction of
the ores or minerals from the ground but also the ordinary treatment
processes normally applied by mine owners or operators in order to
obtain the commercially marketable mineral product or products, and
bw iiuc oi tne transportation of ores or minerals (whether or x,,,
by common carrier) from the point of extraction from the ground
to the plants or mills in which the ordinary treatment processes are
applied thereto as is not in excess of 50 miles unless the Secretary
or his delegate finds that the physical and other requirements are
such that the ore or mineral must be transported a greater distance
to such plants or mills.
Subsection (4) of section 613(c) contained the original list of "ordinary treat-
ment processes" then considered in computing gross income from property.
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special barges, equipped with decks higher in the middle than on the
sides and with "weep holes," to provide maximum drainage of water,
and utilized these barges to transport the remaining sand and gravel to
the shore installations. It was noted that the water content of the sand
and gravel was appreciably reduced during this transportation.
The specific issue arose when Dravo contended that, although its
gross income for depletion purposes was derived by using per ton prices
at the dredge as a basis, and reported on the 1955 return as such, the
gross income should have been computed by using the per ton prices at
its installations on shore, which included transportation costs from
dredge to shore, stockpiling and loading costs.
The theory of the depletion allowance is that a taxpayer is compen-
sated for the capital assets consumed in the production of income. The
depletion allowance is an act of legislative grace and is likened to depre-
ciation of machinery or utilization of raw materials in manufacturing.3
Percentdge depletion, as first enacted in the Revenue Act of 1926,4 was
introduced as A legislative attempt to avoid the inherent difficulties en-
countered in calculating a depletion allowance by the then-existing
statutory methods. 5 The percentage depletion allowance is a deduction
derived by applying a specified statutory percentage to the gross income
realized during the particular taxable year. 6 Since early depletion allow-
ances were concerned primarily with the petroleum industry, "gross
income from property," the base to which the statutory percentage is
applied, was originally described as the gross receipts from the sale of
gas and oil extracted from the property.7 Congress, however, did not
actually define "gross income from property" until 1943, at which time
this new definition was applied retroactively to all taxable years be-
ginning after December 31, 1932.8 This definition became Section
114(b) (4) (B) 9 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and also in-
cluded an extended list of various other minerals eligible for the per-
centage depletion deduction.10 It was not until 1951 that Congress
recognized sand and gravel to be eligible for the five per cent depletion
allowance."-
3 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 408 (1940).
4 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §204(c) (2), 44 Stat. 16.
5 For a summary of cost and discovery depletion, see 4 MERTENS, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§24.29-.31, §§24.36-.40. (1960 Revision).
6 Id. §24.03(c).
7 U.S. v. Cannelton Sewer Pipe Co., 364 U.S. 76, 81 (1960).
s Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, §124(c), 58 Stat. 45, amending INT. REv. CODE OF
1939 §114(b) (4).
9 Essentially identical to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §613(c), supra note 2.
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §114(b) (4) as amended by Revenue Act of 1943, ch.
63, §§124(a), (c), 58 Stat. 44. The 1943 amendment also specified which
processes were included as "ordinary treatment processes" for certain min-
erals not relevant to this discussion.
11 Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, §319(a), 65 Stat. 497 amending INT. REV. CODE
OF 1939, §114(b) (4). This amendment did not specify which processes were
included as "ordinary treatment processes" for sand or gravel.
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Thus, the problem in the Dravo case is interpretation of the phrase
"gross income from property" as defined in Section 613(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954. This definition states that "gross in-
come from property" means "gross income from mining." "Mining,"
for the 1955 tax year, included "the ordinary treatment processes
normally applied . . . to obtain the commercially marketable mineral
product .... -12 It was then necessary to determine whether Dravo's
specific transportation, stockpiling and loading expenses were includ-
ible in this definition of "gross income" as "ordinary treatment
processes."
In judicial analysis of the generalized phrase "gross income from
property," the courts have adhered to the definition as appearing in
Section 114(b) (4) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and
Section 613(c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which es-
sentially equate "gross income from property" with "gross income from
mining." An early case has indicated that "gross income from property"
is t6 be strictly construed. 13 The controversy arises as to what is in-
cluded in "gross income from mining" and specifically what constitutes
"ordinary treatment processes normally applied .. . to obtain a com-
mercially marketable mineral product. . . ." The Revenue Act of 1950
amended the definition of "mining" contained in the Internal Revenue
Code of 193914 so as to include within its scope the phrase: "and so
much of the transportation of ores or minerals (whether or not by
common carrier) from the point of extraction from the ground to the
plants or mills in which the ordinary treatment processes are applied
thereto. . . ."' The United States District Court in the 1954 case of
United States vs. Cherokee Brick & Tile Co.16 held that, within the
statutory definition of "mining" for purposes of computing a depletion
allowance, all processes ordinarily employed in the industry in mining
raw clay and processing it into burnt brick and tile were "ordinary
treatment processes normally applied . . . to obtain a commercially
marketable mineral product." This decision resulted from the fact that.
there was no market for brick and tile clay except in the form of
finished burnt brick and tile. Cherokee, a landmark case,' 7 hinged
'
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §613(c)(2), later amended by Pub. L. No. 86-564,
§302(b) (1), 74 Stat. 292.
's Monroe Coal Mining Co., 7 T. C. 1334 (1946).
14 Tnt. Rev. Code of 1939, §114(b) (4) (B), as amended by Revenue Act of 1943,
ch. 63, §124(c), 58 Stat. 44.15Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, §207(a), 64 Stat 931, later amended by Pub. L.
No. 86-564, §302(b) (1), 74 Stat. 292.16 122 F. Supp. 59, aff'd 218 F. 2d 424 (5th Cir. 1954).
17 Cherokee was the leading case in the area until U.S. v. Cannelton, supra note
7,was decided in 1960. Cherokee was followed in U.S. v. Merry Brothers
Brick & Tile Co., 242 F. 2d 708 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 824
(1957). Only Dragon Cement Co. v. U.S., 144 F. Supp. 188 (1956) criticized
the Cherokee decision, but Dragon was reversed on appeal and the Cherokee
position was adopted. 244 F. 2d 513 (1957).
19651
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largely upon the district court's decision that the term "commercially
marketable mineral product" must be assigned an ordinary meaning, that
is, "a mineral product marketable in commerce."'18 Thus, the court
reasoned that before a product can be considered "commercially market-
able," there must exist an actual market for such mineral product.
Another variation of the theory of marketability arose in Interna-
tional Talc Co. Inc.19 which held that since there was no recognized
market for crude talc and since it was not customarily purchased in the
form of a crude mineral product, the first commercially marketable
form of talc was in the powdered form as it came from petitioner's
mills. This theory was reaffirmed in Black Mountain Corporation,20
holding that an oil treatment applied to coal to make it more salable for
domestic home heating purposes was not the "first commercially market-
able mineral product" since a portion of Black Mountain's annual coal
production was sold to the industrial market without the oil treatment.
The Court in the latter case noted 2' that the regulations interpret the
phrase "commercially marketable mineral product" as meaning the
"first commercially marketable mineral product." (Emphasis added.)
Thus when combining the decisions in International Talc and Cherokee,
the formula appeared to be "the first mineral product which actually
possesses a market in commerce."
The question of profitability in such commercial marketability was
presented to the Supreme Court in United States vs. Cannelton Sewer
Pipe Co.2 2 Cannelton, the respondent, was an integrated miner-manu-
facturer of fire clay and shale for which there was a definite market
but which market was not profitable until respondent processed them
into finished products of sewer pipe and other vitrified articles. The
Supreme Court in reversing the United States Court of Appeals held
that the depletion allowance was to be based upon the first commercial
mineral product marketable in commerce despite its nonprofitability.
Respondent contended that the nonprofitability of the fire clay and shale,
the first commercial mineral product, restricted and limited its actual
marketability in commerce. The Supreme Court noted that depletion is
an allowance for the exhaustion of capital assets and not a subsidy to
manufacturers or high-cost mine operators,2 3 thus implying an industry-
wide rather than an individual standard for initial marketability. If the
respondent's formula had been adopted, a discriminatory situation
would have been created whereby the integrated miner-manufacturer
would have been granted a distinct competitive advantage over the
18 122 F. Supp. at 63.
19 15 T.C. 981 (1950).
2021 T.C. 746 (1954).
21 Id. at 756.
22 Supra note 7.
23 364 U.S. at 86.
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nonintegrated miner and nonintegrated manufacturer 2 4 The Court
therefore rejected Cannelton's profitability argument and interpreted
congressional intent to be that the integrated miner-manufacturer is
to be treated as if the miner sold the mineral to himself for fabrication.
Cannelton has been cited as the controlling case in this area since
its inception in 1960.25 Thus the Cannelton formula appeared to be:
(1) determine the statutory percentage to be applied to the mineral
product, (2) determine what is the proper "cut-off point" at which
the mining and ordinary treatment processes end and the manufacturing
process begins, (3) determine what other costs may be added to the
cost of mining to effect the first commercially marketable mineral
product.
just three days after the Supreme Court decided Cannelton in 1960,
a House-Senate Conference Committee recommendation significantly
altering section 613(c) became law. The amendment, prompted by the
flood of litigation based upon interpretation of this Code section, altered
the definition of "mining" by: (1) deleting the phrase "commercially
marketable mineral product," 26 (2) deleting the phrase "ordinary treat-
ment processes" and inserting additions to the list of treatment processes
which would thereafter be considered "mining,"27 (3) inserting a list
of treatment processes which would not be considered "mining." 28 These
amendments, however, applied only to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1960.29 This legislation enabled the Internal Revenue
Service to determine more easily the second and third factors in the
previously noted Cannelton formula.
Thus in Dravo, a 1965 case contesting a 1955 tax return, the 1954
Code and the Cannelton decision apply, but the 1960 Amendment to
the 1954 Code does not. Dravo contended that its transportation costs
in corveying the sand and gravel from the dredge to its shore installa-
tions and its stockpiling and loading costs were includible in "ordinary
treatment processes" as defined in Section 613(c) (4) of the 1954 Code.
The Court stated that whether the cost of any or all of these three
operations was to be considered in computing gross income is dependent
241d. at 87.
25 Virginia Greenstone Co. v. U.S., 308 F. 2d 669 (4th Cir. 1962) ; Morton Salt
Co. v. U.S., 316 F. 2d 931 (Ct. Cl: 1963), cert denied 375 US. 951 (1963);
C.I.R. v. Hallquist, 291 F. 2d 49 (7th Cir 1961), cert denied 368 U.S. 930(1961); Standard Realization Co. v.. U.S., 289 F. 2d 247 (7th Cir 1961);
U.S. v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 338 F. 2d 798 (10th Cir. 1964); Riddell
v. California Portland Cement Co., 297 F. 2d 345 (9th Cir. 1962).
26 Pub. L. No. 86-564, §302(b), 74 Stat. 292.
27 Ibid.
2SPub. L. No. 86-564, §302(b) (2), 74 Stat. 293, becoming §613(c) (5) of INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954.
29 Pub. L. No. 86-564, §302(c), 74 Stat. 293. There were two significant conces-
sions for certain minerals for tax years beginning before January 1, 1961.
Pub. L. No. 87-312, 75 Stat. 674, changed retroactively the application of
Cannelton in cases of shale, brick, tile clay and fire clay. Pub. L. No. 87-321,
75 Stat. 683, concerns percentage depletion of quartzite and clay.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
upon whether the mined product, after processes on the dredge were
completed, was ready for industrial use or consumption. The Court, in
analyzing Dravo's dredge-to-shore transportation expense, compared
the instant case with Matagorda Shell Co.,30 a pre-Cannelton case which
presented a situation similar to that in Dravo. The petitioner dredged
oyster shell from Matagorda Bay. The shells were washed and screened
on the dredge, loaded onto barges which hauled them to shore where
they were stockpiled and later loaded for shipment. The Tax Court
held that Matagorda's first commercially marketable mineral product
was the oyster shell loaded for shipment on shore. The expenses en-
countered in hauling the shell fifty miles, the statutory limit,31 were held
to be includible in computing its total "gross income from mining"
for purposes of the percentage depletion allowance. The Court in Dravo
seems to distinguish the Matagorda case upon the fact that Dravo's
first customers purchased at the dredge while Matagorda's initial cus-
tomer contact occurred at the shore installations. Thus the transporta-
tion of their respective products from dredge to shore was includible
within the statutory definition of "mining" for Matagorda, while not
so for Dravo.
In dismissing Dravo's contention that stockpiling was an "ordinary
treatment process," the Court cites the traditional theory that stock-
piling "is not designated to effect a physical or chemical change in the
sand and gravel. ' - 2 The Court in noting that the physical separation of
the light from heavy gravel was performed at the dredge, held that
in this situation stockpiling was not a requisite to marketability and
hence not an "ordinary treatment process."
Dravo's loading and transportation expenses were also disallowed
for purposes of gross income computation since under section 613 (c) (2)
transportation is includible in mining only if transportation took the
mineral product to a location at which an ordinary treatment process
was applied.3 3
In conclusion, Dravo Corporation v. United States seems to repre-
sent another phase of continuing judicial and legislative recognition
that uncertainty and general terminology within section 613 results in
litigational havoc, such as that which arose in attempting to interpret
"ordinary treatment processes." The situation becomes more apparent
by illustration of the timing in a depletion controversy. Presuming the
litigation is to commence in the current year and the tax year in dispute
began prior to December 31, 1960, the 1954 Code applies, fraught with
its varying judicial interpretations of "ordinary treatment processes"
3029 T.C. 1060 (1958).
31 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §613 (c) (2).
- 348 F. 2d at 549.
3 Zonolite Co. v. U.S., 211 F. 2d 508 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Winsboro Granite Corp.,
32 T.C. 974 (1959), aff'd per curiam 283 F. 2d 307 (4th Cir. 1960).
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and "commercially marketable mineral product." Cannelton still con-
trols in this area and, a fortiori, in cases involving tax years commenc-
ing before the aforementioned date. The taxpayer must prove that the
processes or transportation items he desires to include in gross income
are within the judicial interpretation of these sections of the Code as
reflected by previous cases. However, for disputed tax years beginning
after December 31, 1960, the 1954 Code, modified by the post-Cannelton
legislation,1 is relevant. The taxpayer must establish that the processes
he performs are within the statutory scope of treatment processes con-
sidered to be "mining." 35 These specific classifications drastically limit
the area of judicial interpretation extant before such legislation was
enacted. The apparent intent of the specificity of the post-Cannelton
was to decrease substantially the amount of litigation in this area,
thereby reducing the need for judicial interpretation. Perhaps this
legislative awareness has been prematurely translated into decisions
such as Dravo Corporation v. United States which today distinguishes
Matagorda Shell Co. but might not have done so five years ago-before
the 1960 amendment which had no direct bearing on Dravo. Speculation
as to the future indicates that prior as well as possible future legislative
specificity will considerably narrow the channels of legislative grace.
THOMAS P. GuszKoWsKI
34 See note 26 to 29 supra.
35 INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §613(c) (4) as amended by Pub. L. No. 86-564,
§302(b), 74 Stat. 292.
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